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Abstract
The terms S (intransitive), A, P (transitive), as well as T and R (ditransitive)
have been used since the 1970s to allow linguists to characterize the differ-
ences between major alignment patterns such as accusative vs. ergative. They
are often taken for granted, but a closer examination of the literature reveals
that they can have three rather different meanings: in the Dixonian approach,
they are used as universal syntactic functions based on transitivity; in the Com-
rian approach, they are seen as comparative concepts for the two arguments of
a typical action clause, and in the Bickelian approach, they are taken as gener-
alized semantic roles (Dowtyan proto-roles). In this article, I explain the three
approaches in some detail, and I argue that the Comrian approach is superior
to the other two approaches. It is better than the Dixonian approach because
it does not take an undefined transitivity notion for granted but defines transi-
tivity in terms of A and P. It is also better than the Bickelian approach because
the Dowtyan proto-roles were designed for the description of a particular class
of English verbs; for crosslinguistic comparison, we need to limit ourselves to
restricted (and semantically coherent) classes of verbs if we want to arrive at
general statements.
Keywords: grammatical relations, relational alignment, semantic roles, syn-
tax, transitivity
This article is dedicated to the memory of my friend and colleague Anna
Siewierska (1955–2011), who I last met at the Zurich workshop.
1. Introduction
Since the 1970s, comparative linguists have often used the notions S, A, P
(or O), T, and R (or G) to compare the coding and behaviour of arguments
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in different languages, and descriptive linguists have sometimes adopted these
notions or terms for describing verbal arguments in individual languages. In
(1) and (2), I give some basic clauses from two languages with annotation
for these notions. Apart from notational differences (P vs. O, R vs. G), the
characterization of examples like these is uncontroversial, so they are a good
starting point for this paper.
(1) German
a. Frau
Ms
A
Jürgens
Jürgens.nom
repariert
repairs
V
den
the
P
Porsche.
Porsche.acc
‘Ms Jürgens is repairing the Porsche.’
b. Der
the
S
König
king.nom
stirbt.
dies
V
‘The king is dying.’
c. Herr
Mr
Kramer
Kramer.nom
schenkt
gives
seiner
his
Tochter
daughter.dat
einen
a
Škoda.
Škoda.acc
A V R T
‘Mr Kramer gives a Škoda to his daughter.’
(2) Ngiyambaa (Australian)
a. Miri-gu
dog-erg
A
bura:y
child(abs)
P
gadhi-yi.
bite-pst
V
‘The dog bit a child.’ (Donaldson 1980: 132)
b. Mamie-gam-bula:
Mamie-name-du(abs)
S
Eva-gam-bula:
Eva-name-du(abs)
manabi-nji.
hunt-pst
V
‘Mamie and Eva hunted.’ (Donaldson 1980: 132)
c. Guya=ndu
fish(abs)=you.nom
bura:y
child(abs)
Nu-nhi.
give-pst
T A R V
‘You gave a child fish.’ (Donaldson 1980: 132)
In this article, I will describe and discuss the way in which these terms are
defined and used by different linguists. For convenience, I will sometimes re-
fer to them as “the SAPTR terms”, or “the SAP terms”. Although it is common
for linguistic terms to be polysemous and linguists are often aware of this, it
does not seem to be widely recognized yet that there are quite different and
incompatible definitions of the SAPTR terms in the literature. The major goal
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of this article is to highlight the diverse uses of the terms, and I hope that in the
future linguists who use them will feel compelled to provide a precise defini-
tion. A subsidiary goal is to discuss some problems and virtues of the different
approaches. I will emphasize the need to distinguish between descriptive cat-
egories and comparative concepts (cf. Haspelmath 2010), a distinction that is
not often made explicitly.
I distinguish three major approaches: the Dixonian approach (Dixon 1994,
2010), the Comrian approach (Comrie 1989, Lazard 2002), and the Bickelian
approach (Bickel & Nichols 2009, Bickel 2011). I will end up favouring the
Comrian approach, where the SAPTR terms are used as comparative concepts,
and where they are restricted to a subclass of two-argument and three-argument
verbs.
Before discussing these three main approaches in detail in Sections 3 to 5,
I will sketch the history of the SAPTR terms in Section 2. In the remainder of
this introductory section, I will briefly explain the rationale for employing such
terms (which did not exist before the 1970s) in the first place.
To make generalizations about argument properties, linguists have used syn-
tactic functions such as subject and object since the nineteenth century.1 In (1),
the Nominative NPs share a number of properties (controlling verb agreement,
ordering properties, omissibility in control constructions, controlling reflex-
ivization, and others) that make it very convenient to describe the situation in
terms of a notion of Subject. We can then say that the ‘repairer’ argument of
reparieren, the ‘giver’ argument of schenken, and the ‘dier’ argument of ster-
ben are mapped onto this syntactic function, and a significant number of prop-
erties follow from this fact. In some special constructions, such as the Passive
(3a) or the be- Applicative (3b), the mapping of roles onto syntactic functions
is different, showing that the syntactic functions are independent of semantic
roles.
(3) German
a. Der
the
Porsche
Porsche.nom
wird
is
von
by
Frau
Ms
Jürgens
Jürgens
repariert.
repaired
‘The Porsche is being repaired by Ms Jürgens.’
1. I use the term syntactic function for concepts like “subject” and “object” (following Dik
1997). Other equivalent terms are “grammatical relation” (Perlmutter 1980), “grammatical
function” (Bresnan 2001), or “syntactic role” (Croft 2001).
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b. Herr
Mr
Kramer
Kramer.nom
be-schenkt
appl-gives
seine
his
Tochter
daughter.acc
mit
with
einem
a
Škoda.
Škoda
‘Mr Kramer gives a Škoda to his daughter.’ (Lit. ‘Mr Kramer gifts
his daughter with a Škoda.’)
In the 1970s, as systematic syntactic research on a wide variety of languages
became more prestigious, it became clear that there is a problem with the older
practice of extending the European subject and object concepts to all other lan-
guages. In particular, in languages with ergative constructions such as Ngiyam-
baa, it was not immediately clear which of the two arguments of ‘bite’ should
be regarded as subject. Taking subject and object in a loose semantic sense,
one might say that, in this language, the Absolutive case marks the intran-
sitive subject and the (mono)transitive object, while the Ergative marks the
(mono)transitive subject. But this approach would be non-rigorous and ethno-
centric. As we saw in (3), the terms subject and object are not semantic notions,
so a rigorous approach needs another set of concepts to describe the distribu-
tion of cases. And, equally damaging, this would be a German-centred way of
describing Ngiyambaa, not better than the opposite (hypothetical) strategy of
saying that the German Nominative codes both the ergative function and the
intransitive absolutive function. With ditransitive clauses like (1c) and (2c), the
situation is completely analogous: it is not helpful to describe Ngiyambaa in
terms of the European “direct object” and “indirect object” notions, because
‘child’ and ‘fish’ are not coded analogously to German (both have Absolutive
case, and there is nothing analogous to the German Dative).
This is where the SAPTR terms come in. With this novel set of terms, we
can say that in German A and S are Nominative-marked and P is Accusative-
marked, while in Ngiyambaa A is Ergative-marked and S and P are Absolutive-
marked. The difference between the two languages (and the types they repre-
sent) can thus be characterized in a general way (i.e., not just for a few par-
ticular verbs such as ‘repair’ or ‘kill’), without privileging the European ac-
cusative system over the Australian ergative system, and without changing the
subject and object notion from a syntactic function concept to a vague semantic
(macro-)role concept. This is known as alignment typology, which is by now
well-established textbook knowledge.
The terms also allow us to state crosslinguistic generalizations like those in
(4) and to define some further comparative concepts like the one in (5).
(4) a. No (or almost no) language has an alignment pattern where A and
P are treated in the same way, differently from S (Comrie 1978:
334).
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b. When alignment of flagging (i.e., case or adpositional marking)
is A=S vs. P, usually P is overtly marked, and when alignment of
flagging is S=P vs. A, usually A is overtly marked (Dixon 1979:
Section 2.3).
(5) A passive construction is a special construction, contrasting with a func-
tionally less restricted active construction, in which the participant cor-
responding to the active P is expressed like the S, and the participant
corresponding to the active A is expressed as an oblique argument (i.e.,
differently from A, S, and P), if at all.
It is unclear how else one might state (4) and (5), so any linguist who is inter-
ested in such generalizations and comparative concepts needs something along
the lines of A, S, and P. But as we will see, there are substantial differences in
the literature in the way these are understood.
The differences between the three approaches will be explained in detail in
Sections 3 to 5 below, but Table 1 provides a brief overview. The distinguishing
features of the Bickelian approach is that S, A, P, etc. are generalized roles
and that they are applied to all verbs, whereas they are syntactic functions for
Dixon and Comrie and are applied only to special subclasses of verbs. The
distinguishing feature of the Comrian approach is that they are exclusively used
as comparative concepts, and that the restriction to a subclass of verbs is made
fully explicit.
Table 1. Three approaches to S, A, P, T, R
Dixonian Comrian Bickelian
Nature: syntactic functions syntactic functions generalized roles
Scope: (only subclass of verbs) only subclass of verbs all verbs
Purpose: comparative + descriptive comparative comparative + descriptive
2. A brief history of the SAPTR terms
The three terms S, A, and O were first used in a published work in Dixon 1972,2
where they are applied to Dyirbal (1972: 59), but it is also made clear that they
are universal entities that all languages have (1972: 128). Evidently, S is remi-
niscent of “subject”, A is reminiscent of “agent”, and O is reminiscent of “ob-
ject”, but Dixon does not present the terms as abbreviations of anything else.
2. Sometimes Dixon’s unpublished University of London dissertation of 1968 is mentioned as
the first use of the S, A, O terms, but this work was not widely used and was soon superseded
by Dixon 1972.
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One suspects that the terms were inspired by Fillmore’s (1968) “cases” (seman-
tic roles as a basis for argument realization), because Fillmore, too, uses the
abbreviations A and O (for “Agentive” (case) and “Objective” (case), respec-
tively, 1968: 24–25), and he uses A and O to capture the accusative/ergative
distinction (1968: 53–54).
Later in the 1970s, Dixon’s usage was adopted by Blake (1976, 1977) and
Comrie (1978), but in a modified form: Blake used Si (for “intransitive sub-
ject”), A, and P, and Comrie used S, A, and P. It seems that the change from
O to P was made in order to make this term more parallel to the A term: just
as A evokes “agent”, P evokes “patient”. Blake’s Si (instead of S) is probably
intended to avoid the impression that A could not be considered a subject (in
fact, Blake (1977) also uses S, for “subject”, i.e., Si + A). Comrie seems to have
adopted P from Blake’s terminology, but S from Dixon, pointing out that it can
also be taken as abbreviation of “single or sole argument” (of an intransitive
verb).
In the 1980s, the SAP/SAO terms became more widely known through
Dixon’s (1979) overview article on ergativity and two overview books on syn-
tactic typology (Comrie 1981 and Mallinson & Blake 1981). Since then, this
kind of alignment typology has become common textbook knowledge (though
the term alignment, introduced by Plank (1979) and picked up by Nichols
(1992), is still not universally used). In 1990, Croft’s overview book adopted
the SAP terminology from Blake and Comrie, and added G (‘goal’) and T
(‘theme’) for the two different objects of ditransitive clauses, which Dryer
(1986) had shown to be parallel to monotransitive clauses in many ways: just
as some constructions treat S and A in the same way (resulting in an accusative
pattern, with P treated in a special way), and other constructions treat S and P in
the same way (resulting in an ergative pattern, with A treated in a special way),
we observe that some constructions treat P and T in the same way (resulting in
an indirective pattern, with R treated in a special way, as in the German exam-
ple (1c)), and other constructions treat P and G in the same way (resulting in a
secundative pattern, with T treated in a special way). The similarities between
monotransitive and ditransitive alignment patterns were again emphasized in
Dryer 2007: 252–259 (written in 2000), and later in Haspelmath 2005a and
subsequent work on ditransitive constructions such as Malchukov et al. 2010.
The parallels are summarized in the figures in (6) (cf. Haspelmath 2005a; note
that Dryer and Haspelmath use R instead of G).
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(6) Alignment patterns
A P
S
accusative
nominative
A P
S
A P
S
ergative
absolutive
accusative alignment neutral alignment ergative alignment
T R
P
indirective
directive
T R
P
T R
P
secundative
primative
indirective alignment neutral alignment secundative alignment
Other prominent works in the 1990s and 2000s that adopted the SAP
terminology are Blake 1994; Siewierska 1984, 2004; Payne 1997; Creis-
sels 2006 (as well as Croft 2001, 2003). Dixon has continued to use SAO
(Dixon 1994, 2000, 2010a, b), as have his associates (Onishi 2001, Aikhen-
vald 2003), as well as many of his students in their grammatical descriptions
(e.g., Kruspe 2004, Guillaume 2008). The SAO terms were also adopted by
Nichols (1992: 65). The PTR terminology for ditransitives was adopted as well
by Siewierska (2004) and many of the contributions in Malchukov et al. (eds.)
2010.
Since the late 1970s, Gilbert Lazard has also worked on ergativity, and he has
used a similar set of three letter-based terms for three notions: X corresponding
to A, Y corresponding to P, and Z corresponding to S (see Lazard 1978, 1994,
1997, 1998, 2002).
There are thus some notational differences, but in general these differences
do not correspond to differences in substance. Several authors explicitly say
that they are just notational differences (Dixon 1994: 6, Note 4; Bickel 2011:
402). That there are also significant differences in the way the terms are un-
derstood has not been discussed in the literature, as far as I am aware, and nei-
ther has it been noticed that they have been used both as comparative concepts
(for crosslinguistic comparison) and as descriptive categories for particular lan-
guages. In textbooks, A and P/O are sometimes still characterized in terms of
the better-known “subject” concept (e.g., Croft 1990: 102, Whaley 1997: 156,
Farrell 2005: 44), or in terms of “agent” and “patient” without further qualifi-
cation (Palmer 1994: 10).
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In the next three sections, I discuss the Dixonian, Comrian, and Bickelian
approaches.
3. The Dixonian approach: S, A, O as universal syntactic functions
For R. M. W. Dixon, the terms A, S, and O refer to universal syntactic func-
tions, much like the grammatical relations 1, 2, and 3 in Relational Grammar
(Perlmutter 1980, Blake 1990), or like subject and object in Lexical-Functional
Grammar (Bresnan 2001, Falk 2006). This position has not changed over the
years:
All languages appear to have transitive and intransitive sentences, and thus to in-
volve the three syntactic functions ‘transitive subject [A]’, ‘transitive object [O]’
and ‘intransitive subject [S]’. (Dixon 1972: 128)
For any discussion of universal grammar, it is most useful to take S, A and O as
the basic grammatical relations [. . . ] (Dixon 1994: 6–7)
Within a cross-linguistic typology, it is most useful to take S, A and O as universal
syntactic relations. (Dixon 2010a: 76)
Dixon has used these terms both for comparative purposes (e.g., Dixon 1979,
1994, 2000) and for language-particular description (e.g., Dixon 1972, 1988;
Dixon with Vogel 2004), and quite a few other linguists have used S, A, and O
for grammatical description (e.g., Donohue 1999, Guillaume 2008, Schapper
2009).
As noted by Lazard (1997), Dixon is not always very clear about the status of
the notions as syntactic functions (he sometimes calls them “semantic-syntactic
categories”), and it is clear that the distinction between A and O is to some
extent semantically grounded: “that argument whose referent is most likely to
be relevant to the success of an activity is identified as A” (Dixon 2010b: 116).
But there are two ways in which A and O are clearly syntactic functions like
subject and object, not semantic roles or role clusters:
First, valency-changing operations change the syntactic function of a verb.
For example, “antipassive places the deep A NP in surface S function, and
marks the deep O NP with an oblique case/preposition/etc.” (Dixon 1979: 119;
similarly Dixon 2010b: 166). And “causative adds a new A argument (proto-
typically to an intransitive clause – the old S becoming O – often also to a
transitive)” (Dixon 2000: 31).
Second, S, A, and O are identified not only on the basis of semantic roles
and coding of arguments, but also on the basis of behavioural properties (cross-
clausal constructions, reflexivization, valency-changing, Dixon 2010b: 118).
This means that the coding properties of A and O can be irrelevant, and we
may have “non-canonically marked A and O” (Aikhenvald et al. (eds.) 2001,
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Dixon 2010b: 52–54). For example, Avar has a dative-marked A with some
experiential verbs, and Yawuru has a dative-marked O with some verbs (Dixon
1994: 121). In this respect, A is much like “subject (of a transitive clause)” in
generative syntax, where coding properties are widely regarded as “superficial”
and not decisive for determining the syntactic function (e.g., Anderson 1976
and much subsequent work).
But since the mid-1970s (Blake 1976, Schachter 1976, Foley & Van Valin
1977), linguists have known that the subject function is not universal, and
this clearly applies to syntactic functions in general (Dryer 1997, Croft 2001,
Lazard 2006). Syntactic functions are defined and identified by different crite-
ria in different languages, so they cannot be equated across languages.3 In the
same way, S, A, and O cannot be used as crosslinguistic categories. Otherwise,
it should be possible to give them a crosslinguistically applicable definition,
but Dixon never provides one.
Basically, A and O are defined as core arguments4 of a transitive clause, but
Dixon gives no definition of “transitive clause”. However, there are many two-
argument clauses that do not seem to be transitive, or that at least are not clearly
transitive (cf. also McGregor 2002: 292). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
such clauses played no role in Dixon’s writings. Consider the two-argument
clauses in (7) from Lezgian (Haspelmath 1993: 268–293). Only the first has a
canonical Ergative-Absolutive coding pattern.
(7) a. Ergative-Absolutive
Sadiq’-a
Sadiq’-erg
jad
water(abs)
qhwa-na.
drink-aor
‘Sadiq’ drank water.’ (Haspelmath 1993: ex. 137)
b. Ergative-Dative
Ajal-r-i
child-pl-erg
muallim.di-z
teacher-dat
hürmet-zawa.
respect-impf
‘The children respect the teacher.’ (Haspelmath 1993: ex. 757a)
3. For example, subjects are usually defined by Nominative case marking and agreement in Latin
and German, but many languages do not have case-marking and/or agreement, or there is no
“nominative” case, or there are several different agreement patterns, and so on. If one then
resorts to rather different criteria such as word order and constituency (as is often done for
Icelandic Dative “subjects”), one ends up with a category that one may call “subjects”, but
that is clearly a different category.
4. Dixon (2010a: 97) briefly characterizes core arguments as arguments that “must be either
stated or understood from the context” (as opposed to peripheral arguments, which are op-
tional). Thus, by “core vs. peripheral argument”, he means what is generally known as “argu-
ments vs. adjuncts”.
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c. Dative-Absolutive
Za-z
I-dat
sa
one
ktab
book(abs)
žgˇa-na.
find-aor
‘I found a book.’ (Haspelmath 1993: ex. 744a)
d. Dative-Postelative
Šarwili.di-z
Šarwili-dat
ada-qhaj
he-poel
kicˇ’e
afraid
xˆa-na-cˇ.
be-aor-neg
‘Šarwili was not afraid of him.’ (Haspelmath 1993: ex. 746a)
e. Absolutive-Adessive
Mašin-ar
car-pl[abs]
xürü-w
village-adess
agaq’-na.
reach-aor
‘The cars reached the village.’ (Haspelmath 1993: ex. 724b)
Are these all transitive clauses? Dixon does not seem to be interested in argu-
ments which are expressed by oblique noun phrases, but they cannot be simply
left aside like adjuncts, because they are obligatory, or if omitted, are under-
stood from the context (see Footnote 4), so they must be (core) arguments.
Probably nobody would want to say that all two-argument clauses are transi-
tive, because in that case even clauses with a locational argument (She went to
town) or with a symmetrical argument (He wrestled with a dragon) would be
transitive. But such clauses normally show quite different coding properties,
and the ergative/accusative distinction that motivated the SAP notions in the
first place was never intended to apply to them.
The general problem is that there are no crosslinguistically applicable syn-
tactic criteria for identifying (mono)transitive clauses – typological work such
as Hopper & Thompson 1980, Kittilä 2002, and Næss 2007 has relied on se-
mantic prototype definitions that do not allow precise delimitation of transitive
clauses from non-transitive clauses. In individual languages, precise criteria for
distinguishing two major clause types (“transitive”, “intransitive”) can often
be found (e.g., particular argument-indexing patterns, passivizability, or even
inflectional classes), but they are quite diverse and not generalizable across
languages. Dixon’s strategy of simply assuming that transitive and intransitive
clauses can be identified in any language cannot be successful.
Most linguists agree that there are two-argument clauses which are intran-
sitive, and in more recent work, Dixon has recognized an intransitive clause
type with an S argument and an additional argument called E (for “extension
to core”) (Dixon & Aikhenvald (eds.) 2000; Dixon 2010a, b). He illustrates this
with examples from Tongan (Dixon 2010a: 99, 2010b: 117; no source is given
for the Tongan data).
(8) a. Na’e
pst
’alu
go
’a
abs
e
art
fefiné.
woman
‘The woman (S) went.’
Brought to you by | MPI fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie
Authenticated | 194.94.96.194
Download Date | 1/30/13 4:47 PM
Comparative concepts for alignment typology 545
b. Na’e
pst
taa’i
see
’a
abs
e
art
tangatá
man
e
erg
he
art
fefiné.
woman
‘The woman (A) hit the man (O).’
c. Na’e
pst
sio
see
’a
abs
e
art
fefiné
woman
ki
dat
he
art
tangatá.
man
‘The woman (S) saw the man (E).’
Dixon says that the (8c) clause is intransitive (with S and E, rather than A and
O), because the perceiver argument shows the same grammatical properties
as the S argument in the plain grammatical sentence. But one could equally
say that Tongan has two types of transitive clauses with A and O, one with an
ergative pattern (8b) and one with an accusative pattern (8c). A similar reason-
ing would lead us to assign the functions S and E to the two arguments in the
Lezgian clause (7e), but what to do with (7c), and especially with (7d), would
still be unclear. (See also Witzlack-Makarevich 2011: Section 7.2 for a similar
critique of Dixon.)
Why have these unclarities not prevented Dixon’s approach from being
widely cited and adopted? It seems that Dixon and his readers focused their
attention on typical transitive clauses with verbs like ‘kill’ or ‘break’, as ex-
emplified by the well-known Dyirbal clause balan d˜ugumbil baNgul yaóaNgu
balgan ‘man is hitting woman’ (Dixon 1972: 59). For a long time, other two-
argument clauses were simply left aside, not only by Dixon, but also by other
researchers who were grappling with similar issues. It is easy to find typi-
cal transitive clauses in every language, and they are clearly a very promi-
nent clause type, so that an intuition-based definition of transitivity has gen-
erally sufficed. And the function-changing alternations of passive, antipassive,
causative, and applicative also seemed to work in terms of A and O as defined
loosely by Dixon.
4. The Comrian approach: A and P as comparative concepts for the two
arguments of typical transitive clauses
A way of preserving Dixon’s most important insights, while at the same time
eliminating the weaknesses of his approach, is to say explicitly what has per-
haps been implicit in Dixon’s work: that A and P can be identified readily only
for typical transitive clauses (i.e., clauses with physical effect verbs like ‘kill’
or ‘break’), while other two-argument clauses are not considered in this con-
text. In effect, it says that transitive clauses of the ‘kill’ or ‘break’ type are
the typical two-argument clauses. This approach would arrive at the same con-
clusions as Dixon for the typical clauses as in (1) and (2), but would not say
anything about atypical clauses like (7b–e) from Lezgian or (8c) from Tongan.
At first, it appears that this makes this approach less comprehensive, and one
may wonder how it could be extended to atypical two-argument clauses. The
answer is two-fold.
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First, from a crosslinguistic perspective, the limitation to typical transitive
clauses is no problem, because atypical two-argument clauses differ drastically
across languages anyway, and in practice, knowing that a language has a dom-
inant accusative (A=S vs. P) or ergative (A vs. S=P) pattern does not tell us
anything about the atypical two-argument clauses. In particular, the treatment
of arguments of experiential verbs (as in (7c, d), (8c)) is quite different across
languages (e.g., Bossong 1998), but it does not seem that these differences can
be predicted from the differences in the treatment of typical transitive clauses.
Thus, typologists must come up with something special for experiential clauses
anyway.
Second, from a language-particular perspective, we simply do not need the
SAPTR terms. For German, for example, it is quite acceptable and in fact com-
mon practice to work in terms of syntactic functions such as “Nominative ar-
gument”, “Accusative argument”, “Genitive argument”, “Prepositional phrase
argument”, etc. (e.g., Engel 1988). Asking which of these is the “subject” is not
necessary (Reis 1982). For English, it is not necessary to distinguish between
A and S either (because the transitive Subject and the intransitive subject be-
have alike). For Dyirbal, we can follow Dixon (1972) and say that there is a
Deep Subject function that is occupied, for instance, by the hittee argument
of ‘hit’, the comer argument of ‘come’, the hitter argument of the Antipassive
form of ‘hit’, and so on. Presented in this way, the three languages are diffi-
cult to compare, and it is precisely for comparative purposes that the SAPTR
terms were originally created. But language-particular description is not aided
by these terms (except in the trivial sense that a typologically-oriented descrip-
tion may well be easier to understand, even if is less elegant and less faithful to
the inner workings of the language).
A definition of A and P along these lines that is based on only a subclass of
transitive clauses is given by Comrie (1981: 105, 1989: 111):5
In the prototypical transitive situation, the participants are an agent and a patient,
and this remains constant irrespective of the morphological or syntactic behaviour
of the sentence in any individual language. We may therefore, starting originally
with transitive predicates describing actions, label the agent as A, and the patient
as P, so that in the sentence I hit you [. . . ] irrespective of the case marking of the
various noun phrases I will be A and you will be P. [. . . W]e can continue to use [A
and P] even when we pass beyond prototypical transitive situations (i.e. actions)
to other constructions [. . . ] A and P are thus syntactic terms, whose prototypes are
defined in semantic terms.
5. Note that Comrie (1978) did not give this prototype-based definition yet: A was defined as
“that argument of a transitive verb that would be its subject in a non-Ergative language like
English”, and P was “the argument that would be the direct object” (Comrie 1978: 330–331).
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Indeed, it seems to be the case that in all languages, two-argument verbs with
typical agents and patients are treated in the same way, i.e., we never find sig-
nificant variation in the coding of verbs like ‘kill’, ‘break’, ‘cut’, ‘beat’, ‘burn’,
‘grind’, ‘saw’, ‘wash’.6
Similarly to Comrie, Andrews (1985, 2007) starts out with the class of “pri-
mary transitive verbs” (PTVs), i.e., verbs with typical agents and patients,
which “play a fundamental role in all languages” (Andrews 1985: 68). He then
defines A and O as follows:
If an NP is serving as argument of a two-argument verb, and receiving the mor-
phological and syntactic treatment normally accorded to an Agent of a PTV, we
shall say that it has the grammatical function A; if it is an argument of a verb with
two or more arguments receiving the treatment normally accorded to the Patient
of a PTV, we shall say that it has the grammatical function O.
The most explicit justification of the idea that A and P should be defined
with respect to a prototypical action is given in Lazard 2002.7 Like Comrie and
Andrews, Lazard notes that there is a robust crosslinguistic generalization un-
derlying A and P:8 the construction expressing a prototypical action9 (what he
calls the “major biactant construction”10) has proved to “occupy a special place
in the grammar of most (or all) languages” (Lazard 2002: 153). He also notes
that the valency frame of these verbs can justifiably be called “major biactant
construction” because in very many languages, it is also used for verbs that ex-
press situations other than prototypical actions. For example, many languages
use this construction also for verbs of perception (e.g., in Dyirbal, ‘mother saw
father’ is Numa yabu-Ngu buran [mother father-erg saw], Dixon 1994: 10),
6. Even though lexeme-based splits are thus excluded by this approach, there are of course still
splits based on referential properties of the NP (pronoun vs. full noun, animate vs. inanimate,
etc.), on tense and aspect, and so on (as discussed in detail by Witzlack-Makarevich 2011
and elsewhere). This means that alignment in the traditional sense can only be determined
within such domains, not across them. Thus, Comrie (2005) treats alignment of case marking
separately for full nouns and pronouns.
7. Surprisingly, Lazard (2002) does not refer to Comrie (1981, 1989) or Andrews (1985). It is
quite possible, however, that he arrived at very similar conclusions independently (perhaps in
the sense that by the 1990s, the Comrian use of A and P was well-entrenched in the field, even
though few people had made the definitions of these concepts explicit).
8. Recall that Lazard uses X and Y instead of A and P, but this is a purely notational matter that
I will ignore in the following.
9. This is defined as “an effective volitional discrete action performed by a controlling agent and
actually affecting a well individuated patient”, e.g., The hunter killed the rabbit (Lazard 2002:
152).
10. The term “biactant” simply means “two-argument”. In the tradition of Tesnière (1959), Lazard
uses actant for what is called argument here. I agree with Lazard that actant is in prin-
ciple preferable to argument (cf. Lazard 1997: 247), but I use argument because the term
is now so well entrenched.
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and in some languages, we find the major biactant construction used even in
situations that have hardly any similarity to prototypical actions, e.g., (9).
(9) a. French
L’
the
école
school
jouxte
is.next
la
the
mairie.
town.hall
‘The school is beside the town hall.’
b. French
La
the
chambre
room
sent
smells
la
the
pomme.11
apple
‘The room smells of apples.’
c. This room sleeps four persons.
However, the further we go from prototypical (physical-effect) actions, the
more variation there is across languages (Tsunoda 1985, Malchukov 2005).
With perception verbs like ‘see’, there is some variation (cf. Bossong 1998),
though most languages seem to be like English and Dyirbal in using their ma-
jor biactant construction for them. In cases like (9), there is so much variation
that even French and English, two languages that are otherwise very similar
typologically, have different constructions.
On the basis of the notion of the major biactant construction, Lazard then
defines A as the argument of this construction that represents the agent when
the construction expresses an action, and P as the argument that represents the
patient when the construction expresses an action. This is fully compatible with
Comrie’s and Andrews’s definitions, only somewhat more elaborate. Another
author who provides a definition of A and P in the same terms is Creissels
(2006: 283).12
11. It should be noted that in these discussions only coding properties are taken into account, and
(9b) clearly shows the same coding properties as other transitive clauses in French. It differs
from them in some behavioural properties, as noted, e.g., by Melis (2002: 62) – for example,
(9b) cannot be passivized. This is a general fact about Comrian A, S, P, T, R: they are defined
with respect to coding properties, not behavioural properties.
12. A reviewer is worried that the definitions of the crosslinguistic concepts A and P thus pre-
suppose a crosslinguistic generalization (namely that there is no variation in the coding of
typical physical effect verbs) that is not firmly established. But if it turned out that a language
has two different constructions for typical action verbs, this would just mean that there would
be two different instances of A and P. This is not desirable, because it makes crosslinguistic
comparison more complicated, but it is not an inconsistency. In fact, a very similar situation
commonly arises with intransitive S, which is often coded differently with different verbs
(see Section 7). So the observation that languages strongly tend to have only a single major
biactant construction is not a precondition for the viability of the definitions, but merely an
argument in favour of their usefulness. (A well-known language which has two major biactant
constructions is Tagalog, and the resulting impossibility of subsuming the language under the
classical alignment types is well known.)
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What the Comrian approach shares with the Dixonian approach is that A
and P are conceived of as syntactic functions, so that it is possible to say that
in passivization, the A becomes an oblique, and the P becomes an S (Comrie
1989: 114, Lazard 2002: 159).13
But it is crucially different from the Dixonian approach in that it does not try
to define A, S, and P on the basis of transitivity, but it is the other way round: a
transitive clause is one with A and P, and an intransitive clause is one that lacks
A and P (Andrews 1985: 68, Blake 1994: 206, Creissels 2006: 284).14 As we
saw that Dixon was unable to give good independent criteria for identifying
transitive clauses, this is an important advantage.
Moreover, in the Comrian approach, A and P of transitive clauses are by
definition marked “canonically”. “Non-canonically marked” A and P, as they
exist for Dixon, are impossible for Comrie, Andrews, Lazard, and Creissels. In
clauses like (10a, b) from German, Dixon would probably say that ‘the boy’
is in A function in both cases, while ‘the baby’ is in O function, and that both
NPs in (10a) and ‘the baby’ in (10b) are marked non-canonically.
(10) a. Dem
the
Jungen
boy.dat
gefällt
pleases
das
the
Baby.
baby.nom
‘The boy likes the baby.’
b. Der
the
Junge
boy.nom
hilft
helps
dem
the
Baby.
baby.dat
‘The boy is helping the baby.’
In the Comrian approach, none of the arguments of these clauses would be A
and P, because they do not use the major biactant construction. Hence both
clauses would qualify as intransitive.
Now of course if “intransitive” is no longer defined as “containing a single
argument” (as in Dixon’s work, at least until the introduction of “extended
13. Note that this was not so clear yet in Comrie 1978: on the one hand, Comrie said in that paper
that in the antipassive, A becomes S (1978: 363), but on the other hand, he said that in the
passive clause John was kissed by Mary, Mary is A and John is P (1978: 368). Here A and
P seem to have been used as generalized semantic roles, as in the Bickelian approach, not
as syntactic functions. Likewise, Comrie (1978: 375–376) applied A and P to nominaliza-
tions like Russian razrušenie gorod-a vrag-om [destruction city-gen enemy-ins] ‘the city’s
destruction by the enemy’, where he said that P stands in the genitive, while A stands in the
instrumental. Again, here A and P were used in a different, more semantic sense. (This latter
usage of the SAP terms was adopted by Koptjevskaja-Tamm 1993.)
14. A reviewer notes that it is circular to define transitivity in terms of A and P (as proposed by
myself), and at the same time to define A and P in terms of “prototypical transitive situations”,
as is done in the Comrie quotation above. This is true, and therefore I recommend following
Andrews (1985, 2007) and Lazard (2002) in defining A and P in terms of prototypical actions
with two participants, not in terms of transitivity.
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intransitive” clauses like (8c)), we also need a new definition of S. Such a
definition is provided by Andrews (1985: 68):
An NP in an intransitive sentence that is receiving the treatment normally accorded
to the single argument of a one-argument predicate will be said to have S function.
Thus, in (10a) das Baby is S, while in (10b) der Junge is S (because both are in
the nominative case). Nothing is said about the non-S arguments of intransitive
clauses (which would be E in Dixon’s approach), which is just as well, because
the various non-S arguments do not seem to have much in common.
Linguists who seem to have adopted the Comrian approach often define A
and P in terms of similarity of the argument’s role to the agent and patient roles:
(11) A P
a. Payne
(1997: 75)
“most agent-like
argument of a
transitive clause”
“least agent-like
argument of a
transitive clause”
b. Dryer
(2007: 252)
“the more agent-like
argument in a
transitive clause”
“the more patient-like
argument [in a
transitive clause]”
c. Haspelmath
(2009: 512)
“most agent-like
argument of a
transitive clause”
“most patient-like
argument of a
transitive clause”
However, even though such short definitions of A and P are convenient, they
are not accurate. In the definitions in (11), transitivity is used as a definiens,
although it must itself be defined in terms of A and P, as we saw. Moreover,
the definitions in (11) do not make it clear in what way non-agent A arguments
(like l’école, la chambre, this room in (9)) are more agent-like than the cor-
responding P argument. Do these authors mean that the semantic role of such
arguments is more similar to the agent role than the role of the P argument?
In that case, their definitions would characterize generalized semantic roles,
which is not what the Comrian A and P are. Or is “agent-like” another way of
saying that the A argument is treated morphosyntactically like an agent? In the
latter case, the comparative (“more/most agent-like”)) would be misleading –
one should simply say that “the A is the morphosyntactically agent-like argu-
ment”.15 But this is too short to be fully clear. To get an accurate definition,
15. Another way of making the short definitions in (11) more accurate would be to replace “transi-
tive” by “typical action”: “A is the agent argument of a typical action clause” (Comrie’s (2005:
398) definition comes close to this). The fact that other, non-agent arguments are coded in the
same way would not be covered by this definition, but in many comparative contexts this is
not important.
Brought to you by | MPI fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie
Authenticated | 194.94.96.194
Download Date | 1/30/13 4:47 PM
Comparative concepts for alignment typology 551
one needs Lazard’s notion of major two-argument construction (unfortunately,
the definitions are not particularly short):
(12) A P
“the argument of the major two-
argument construction that rep-
resents the agent when the con-
struction expresses an action”
“the argument of the major two-
argument construction that repre-
sents the patient when the con-
struction expresses an action”
It should be apparent from this discussion that the Comrian concepts A, S,
and P are comparative concepts, and are not really suitable as descriptive cat-
egories of particular languages. This becomes clear as soon as one extends
one’s purview beyond prototypical two-argument clauses. For example, Ice-
landic provides robust evidence for a “Subject” function that encompasses not
only A and S arguments, but also a substantial number of oblique-marked NPs
(e.g., Andrews 2001). From the point of view of Icelandic, there is no particu-
lar reason to privilege A and S, and the notion of “major biactant construction”
need not play any role in the description of the language. But to compare Ice-
landic with other languages, we do need A and S. Whereas Dixon sees his
concepts as part of Basic Linguistic Theory, a descriptive framework that can
be used to describe any language, the Comrian concepts are primarily used for
comparative purposes. The arguments of non-prototypical two-argument verbs
will eventually have to be drawn into the comparison, but it may well be that
they show so much idiosyncrasy that not many generalizations of the type in
(4) and (5) will be found.
That S, A, and P are comparative syntactic functions and crucially differ-
ent from the descriptive syntactic functions that a language-particular analysis
would adopt was noted early on by Goddard (1982: 181–184), who argued
against the view that Dixon’s S, A, and O are syntactic categories or syntactic
functions and preferred to label them “language independent syntactic con-
texts” (1982: 182), i.e., etic comparative concepts. He acknowledged their
value to linguistic typology but disputed their value to description. Andrews
(1985: 66, 2007: 134) makes a distinction between “grammatical functions”
like A, S, and O and “grammatical relations” like Subject and Object in En-
glish. Only a grammatical relation is something that is “generally significant
for the workings of the grammatical principles” of a particular language. And
McGregor (2002: 292–293) criticizes Dixon’s A, S, and O, but notes (2002:
Note 2) that his criticism applies “specifically to the S-A-O theory in its emic
interpretation”, not when these terms are used as “etic conveniences” in typol-
ogy.
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5. The Bickelian approach: S, A, P, T, and G as generalized semantic
roles
The SAPTR terms are often seen as “a sort of compromise between thematic
roles and grammatical relations” (Koptjevskaja-Tamm 1993: 12), and Dixon
used to call them “semantico-syntactic roles” (1979: 61). But in fact, as we saw,
they are syntactic functions both in the Dixonian and in the Comrian approach,
even though the definition of the functions has a semantic dimension.
Since the syntactic functions have an important semantic dimension, it is
easy to give a different sense to the SAP terms, namely as referring to the se-
mantic dimension itself, or in other words to generalized semantic roles. In
Hopper & Thompson’s (1980) well-known theory of transitivity, A and O are
the terms for “the two participants in a two-participant clause” (Hopper &
Thompson 1980: 252), and they say explicitly that they use the terms differ-
ently from Dixon: “We make no claims about the grammatical relations that
the NP arguments referring to these partcipants might bear to the verb”. Næss
(2007: 7) likewise uses A and O for the two participants of a two-participant
clause, regardless of the formal coding, in explicit contrast to Dixon.
Mithun & Chafe (1999) discuss S, A, and O in the context of alignment
typology and interpret them as generalized semantic roles, as seems clear from
the alternatives that they present: they actually argue against S, A, and O, and
instead favour the information-structural function of starting point (for S+A),
the semantic roles agent (for A and agentive S) and patient (for O and patientive
S), and the notion of immediate involvement (for S+O).16 Kibrik’s (1997: 290)
interpretation is very similar – he talks about “the hyperroles Agentive (A) and
Patientive (O/P)”.
This use of the letter terms S, A, P, T, and G for generalized semantic roles,
which are in stark contrast to grammatical relations, is clearest in recent work
by Bickel and associates (Nichols 2008, Bickel & Nichols 2009, Bickel et al.
2010, Bickel 2011, Witzlack-Makarevich 2011). These generalized roles are
defined as in (13), with different roles for the three types of numerical valency
(Bickel & Nichols 2009: 307, Bickel et al. 2010: 384):
(13) a. One-place predicates:
S the sole argument of a one-place predicate
16. Mithun & Chafe evaluate S, A, and O as descriptive categories for the analysis of particular
languages (their examples are English, Seneca, and Yup’ik) and find them wanting: “Alterna-
tive patterns are not simply a question of alternative structural ‘alignments’, but the result of
the grammaticization of distinct ways in which referents may be related to events and states”
(Mithun & Chafe 1999). They do not seem to realize that Comrian A, S, and P are used as
purely comparative concepts, not implying anything about the optimal language-particular
analysis.
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b. Two-place predicates:
A1 the more agent-like argument of a two-place predicate
P the less agent-like argument of a two-place predicate17
c. Three-place predicates:
A2 the most agent-like argument of a three-place predicate
G the more goal-like (or patient-like) argument of the non-
agent-like arguments of a three-place predicate
T the less goal-like (or patient-like) argument of the non-
agent-like arguments of a three-place predicate
At first glance, the definitions look much like the simplified definitions of Com-
rian A, S, and P (see (11) above), but there is a big difference. While Comrie,
Blake, Dryer, Lazard, Siewierska, and others (sometimes implicitly) limit A
and P to typical transitive clauses, for Bickel and his associates there is explic-
itly no such limitation: A1 and P apply to all two-argument verbs. Similarly,
while Malchukov et al. (2010) limit A, T, and R in ditransitive clauses to trans-
fer verbs (‘give’, ‘send’, etc.), Bickel et al. (2010) apply A2, G, and T to all
three-argument verbs. The scope of the generalized semantic roles is thus sig-
nificantly greater than the scope of Comrian S, A, P, T, R.
But as a consequence, while the Bickelian approach agrees with the Dixo-
nian and the Comrian approach in the assignment of labels to our initial exam-
ples in (1) and (2), it differs strikingly from them with other verbs, as illustrated
in (14).
(14) a. The
A1
woman went
V
to
P
town.
b. German
Mir
I.dat
A1
graut
dreads
V
vor
of
P
dem
the
Examen.
exam
‘I am dreading the exam.’
c. She
A2
covered
V
you
G
with
T
an umbrella.
d. You
A2
cut
V
wood
G
with
T
a saw.
An argument is regarded as agent-like to the extent that is has one or more of
the agent properties in (15a), and as goal-like (or patient-like) to the extent that
is has one or more of the goal (or patient) properties in (15b). These properties
17. In most work published so far, Bickel and Nichols use O instead of P, but in more recent work
(and in Witzlack-Makarevich 2011), P is used, so I use P in discussing the Bickelian approach
here.
Brought to you by | MPI fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie
Authenticated | 194.94.96.194
Download Date | 1/30/13 4:47 PM
554 Martin Haspelmath
are called “entailments”, and they are largely taken from Dowty (1991) (see
Witzlack-Makarevich 2011: Section 4.3 for detailed discussion).
(15) a. Agent entailments:
causing an event (e.g., unemployment in unemployment causes
delinquency)
volitional (e.g., she in she helped him)
sentient (e.g., she in she knew the answer)
existing independently of the event (e.g., he in he needs a new
car)
b. Goal (or patient) entailments (Bickel et al. 2010: 384):
undergoing a change of state or in experience (him in give him
something)
causally affected by another participant (it in cut it with some-
thing, load it with something)
stationary relative to movement of another participant (it in load
it with something)
It is not quite clear whether these agent and goal/patient properties all have
equal status, and what happens if the two arguments of the verb have an equal
number of agent properties or goal/patient properties (e.g., in The room smells
of apples in (9b), where independent existence seems to be the only relevant
entailment, shared by both arguments). It also seems that these criteria cannot
distinguish the two arguments of symmetrical verbs (e.g., French jouxter in
(9a), wrestle with, etc.).
But apart from such (perhaps minor) issues, the most striking consequence
of the Bickelian approach is that A and P (and also T and G) are assigned
to quite different kinds of arguments for different verb classes. In this way,
they are like Dixonian A and O, even though the unity of the latter is justified
syntactically, not semantically.18 But since the arguments can be diverse syn-
tactically as well, the “non-canonical” marking of A and P can be extreme: in
an accusative language like German, P is in the Accusative case with verbs like
umbringen ‘kill’ and schlagen ‘beat’, but is marked as a directional adverbial
with movement verbs like gehen ‘go’, as a prepositional object with verbs like
grauen (cf. 16b), is in the Dative with helfen-type verbs (cf. 10b), and is even
in the Nominative case with verbs like gefallen (cf. 10a).
18. Dixon and Bickel would both say that der Junge in (10b) is an A, but for different reasons:
Dixon because it behaves like other A arguments syntactically, Bickel because it has more
agent entailments than dem Baby.
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With such a large amount of non-canonical marking, both the Dixonian and
the Bickelian approach have to confront the question how useful it is to have
concepts which are highly heterogeneous both formally and semantically. Of-
ten one accepts semantic heterogeneity associated with formal unity (e.g., pol-
ysemy), or formal heterogeneity with semantic unity (e.g., allomorphy). But
the Bickelian A, P, G, and T are heterogeneous both semantically and formally.
As a result of this heterogeneity, we end up saying that German has not just
accusative, but also ergative alignment (because of experiential verbs of the
gefallen class, which have a Nominative P), and Lezgian has not just ergative,
but also accusative alignment (because of movement verbs of the ‘go’ type,
which have an Absolutive A and a locational P). Such statements show that
in practice, the Bickelian approach differs more drastically from the original
Dixonian approach than the Comrian approach does. In effect, virtually all
languages end up being “split-A” or “split-P” languages (i.e., languages with
different coding of A/P depending on the verb class).
At this point we should recall the purpose for which the SAPTR terms were
originally created: to allow us to express perceived major typological differ-
ences, to state crosslinguistic generalizations, and to define further compara-
tive concepts (as we saw in Section 1). But on the Bickelian approach, it is not
straightforward to state the generalizations in (4) or to define the passive as in
(5). In fact, Bickel & Nichols (2009: 315) explicitly mention the possibility of
A=P alignment, which is ruled out by (4a), but which arises in their system
with minor verb classes, such as the Latin pudet (‘be ashamed’) class, which
takes an accusative experiencer (an accusative A in their terms). The Bicke-
lian approach of looking at all verbs with the same numerical valency from a
similar perspective is perfectly coherent, but one needs to ask how fruitful it
is.
Bickel & Nichols (2009: 308) themselves note: “The alignment patterns of
chief typological interest are those that are the major or dominant or basic
type in one or another language”. Thus, while strictly speaking, German is
not only accusative but also ergative, and Lezgian is not only ergative but also
accusative, in practice typologists are interested primarily in the alignment of
“major or dominant or basic” P with S. One can express this by saying that
grammatical relations are characterized not only in terms of generalized se-
mantic roles, but also in terms of predicate classes (as “conditions” on gram-
matical relations, Bickel 2011: 413–415). In German, the P of the major class
is marked by Accusative case, the P of the helfen class is expressed by Dative
case, and so on:
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(16) Two-argument verbs in German
A P
Nom Acc major/dominant/basic class (i.e., largest/most
productive)
Nom Dat helfen class (‘help’, etc.)
Dat Nom gefallen class (‘please’, etc.)
Dat vor + NPDat grauen class (‘dread’, etc.)
Thus, one could distinguish between Amajor, Ahelfen, Agefallen, and between
Pmajor, Phelfen, Pgrauen, and so on. This would then allow us to express every-
thing that is expressed by A and P in the Comrian approach by means of Amajor
and Pmajor, i.e., Amajor would be just a different notation for Comrian A.19
But at this point we must ask why we need A and P (and T and G) as gen-
eralized semantic roles at all, i.e., why Amajor and Pmajor are not sufficient.
And here the answer seems to be that S, A, P, T, and G are not exclusively
or even primarily conceived of as comparative concepts, but are intended to
be used also for descriptive purposes. And to describe a language, one can-
not limit oneself to the major verb classes. Both Nichols and Bickel have been
influenced in their thinking by Foley & Van Valin (1984), Van Valin (2005),
who work with the semantic macroroles Actor (A) and Undergoer (U), and by
Dowty (1991), who works with the protoroles Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient
(and of course Foley & Van Valin have been influenced by Dowty’s earlier
work, Dowty 1979). But Van Valin and Dowty are not primarily concerned
with formulating crosslinguistic generalizations or alignment typologies, but
with building an explicit descriptive framework for individual languages. Thus,
they need descriptive categories, and comparative concepts are not sufficient
for their purposes.
Be that as it may, the key question is how the definitions of A and P (and
T and G) given in (15) are motivated. Why use these seven semantic cri-
teria, rather than fewer or more, or others? Bickel, Nichols, and Witzlack-
Makarevich do not say anything about this and just refer to Dowty (1991).
But Dowty is not particularly interested in differences between languages, and
in fact he is almost exclusively concerned with describing English subject-
19. There is another difference, because in the Bickelian approach, the “major” type is defined
in terms of type frequency, not prototypicality. Witzlack-Makarevich (2011: Section 7.2) dis-
cusses the determination of the major class (“default class” in her terminology) in some detail,
and ends up proposing that a language can be said to have a major class if the largest predi-
cate class is at least ten percentage points larger than the second largest class. However, it is
quite likely that in all languages, the class of physical effect verbs that Lazard characterizes as
the most typical action verb class is the major class by this criterion, so that in practice, there
would be no significant difference between the Comrian approach and the Bickelian approach
here.
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object verbs (ignoring all other two-argument verbs, and ignoring languages
that work differently). His lengthy discussion motivates the use of these crite-
ria for English quite well, but one wonders why these very same criteria should
be used for locational and experiential two-arguments and other languages as
well. Another important question concerning (13) is how the decision to base
the generalized semantic roles on numerical valency is motivated. Why are
agent and patient entailments regarded as irrelevant for one-argument verbs?
Dowty (1991: 605–613) applies his proto-roles to monovalent verbs as well,
and many other authors (e.g., Foley & Van Valin (1984), Kibrik (1997: 291),
Primus (1999: 90–100), Mithun & Chafe (1999: 576–579)) opt for generalized
roles that capture the well-known similarities between transitive and intransi-
tive agents/patients in the active-stative type (more on this type in Section 7
below).
Of course, there is a large amount of agreement among languages in treating
typical physical effect verbs as the core of their major two-argument verb class
(with A and P arguments), so the fact that Dowty’s entailments are designed
for the major two-argument verb class of English means that his Proto-Agent is
quite similar to Comrie’s A, and his Proto-Patient is quite similar to Comrie’s P.
But despite these similarities, Dowtyan proto-roles and Comrian comparative
syntactic functions are quite different in nature. The former are designed to
describe productive language-particular argument realization classes, while the
latter are designed to capture salient crosslinguistic differences.
Before concluding this section, let us briefly consider Croft’s (2001) charac-
terization of the SAP terms, because like Bickel and associates, he defines S,
A, and P as generalized semantic roles (Croft 2001: 136):
[. . . ] the terms A, S, and P must be interpreted semantically. A, S and P each
stand for a polysemous category made up of a cluster of semantic participant
roles found in one-participant situations (S) and two-participant situations (A,
P).
Croft does not characterize A and P further, but the later discussion, where
he introduces the additional notions Ex and St (for experiencer and stimulus),
makes it clear that A and P only refer to typical agents and patients for him,
and do not extend to experiencers and stimuli. And in Croft 1998: 51–52, A
and P are used interchangeably with “subject” and “object”, making it clear
that A and P are not purely semantic notions. Thus, in Jane sprayed paint on
the wall, paint is object/P, while in Jane sprayed the wall with paint, the wall
is object/P (Croft 1998: 39). While Croft argues that this is actually a seman-
tic alternation (Croft 1998: 44), and his A and P categories thus become as
heterogenous semantically as Dowty’s Proto-Agent and Proto-Patient, he em-
phasizes the role of physical effect events as the transitive prototype, much as
in Comrie’s, Andrews’s, and Lazard’s work (Croft 1998: 25, 53). Thus, Croft’s
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approach is actually a variant of the Comrian approach, and quite unlike the
Bickelian approach.
6. On T and R in ditransitive clauses
The first author to extend the spirit of the SAP terms to three-argument clauses
was Croft (1990: 102–111), who followed Dryer’s (1986) observation that the
contrast between the indirective (“indirect-object”) pattern (P=T vs. R) and
the secundative (“secondary-object”) pattern (P=R vs. T) is quite similar to
the contrast between the ergative pattern and the accusative pattern. But Croft
(1990) did not define T and R (in his notation, G) other than saying that T is the
“direct object” and R is the “indirect object” (taking these syntactic terms from
French or English in an extended semantic sense, following much earlier us-
age). However, both Dryer’s (1986) and Croft’s (1990) examples make it clear
that they mean verbs like ‘give’, ‘bring’, ‘show’, ‘teach’, and ‘send’, which in
many languages are treated similarly; in other words, verbs of physical transfer
of possession and verbs of mental transfer of experience. Other three-argument
verbs, such as verbs of putting (‘put’, ‘load’, ‘stick’, ‘wrap’, ‘cover’), or in-
strument verbs (‘cut’, ‘saw’, ‘hit (with hand)’, etc.) are never mentioned in
this early seminal work, even though in some languages such verbs are treated
much like transfer verbs. An example of the latter comes from Yoruba:
(17) a. Bó
.
lá
Bola
fún
give
adé
Ade
ní
sec
ìwé.
book
‘Bola gave Ade a book.’ (Atoyebi et al. 2010: 145)
b. Ó
he
gbá
hit
mi
me
ní
ins
igi.
stick
‘He hit me with a stick.’ (Atoyebi et al. 2010: 149)
Just as A and P were defined in the Comrian approach as the agent and the
patient of typical physical effect verbs, plus whatever arguments are treated in
the same way, we may define T and R as the theme and the recipient of typical
physical transfer verbs of possession (‘give’, ‘lend’, ‘send’, etc.), plus whatever
arguments are treated in the same way. For example, the causee of a causative
construction is often treated like the R of a physical transfer verb. We may then
say that the causative is formed as in (19a) in terms of R and T, similarly to
what we would say about passives and locative applicatives in terms of A, S,
and P:
(18) a. Causative: XA – YP > ZA – XR – YT
b. Passive: XA – YP > YS – Xobl
c. Applicative: XS – Yloc > XA – YP
Brought to you by | MPI fuer evolutionaere Anthropologie
Authenticated | 194.94.96.194
Download Date | 1/30/13 4:47 PM
Comparative concepts for alignment typology 559
And again as with two-argument clauses, we can define “ditransitive” in terms
of R and T, rather than defining (in Dixonian manner) R and T in terms of
“ditransitive”.
However, how well-motivated is the decision to focus on physical transfer
verbs as the basis for the definition of T and R? In the case of A and P, Andrews
and Lazard noted that apparently in all languages, all typical physical action
verbs behave alike, and in all languages there is a substantial class of verbs that
behave in this way, often going significantly beyond the class of physical action
verbs (this is probably even the major two-argument class in all languages).
With three-argument verbs, we can neither say with confidence that physical
transfer verbs of possession tend to be the major class, nor that all physical
transfer verbs behave in the same way. Languages do not have a large number
of physical transfer verbs of possession, and verbs of putting and instrumental
verbs, where both non-agent arguments are inanimate, are quite diverse as well.
Moreover, even within the class of physical transfer verbs, there tends to be
more variation than within the class of physical effect verbs. In English, too,
some verbs have multiple coding patterns:
(19) a. They supplied the street dealers with drugs.
b. They supplied drugs to the street dealers.
It has been noted repeatedly that the most frequent physical transfer verb,
‘give’, is often quite unique in its grammatical behaviour (Comrie & Borg
1984, Kittilä 2006). On the other hand, it does seem to be the case that physical
transfer verbs of possession tend to be much more frequent in texts than other
three-argument verbs, so that at least from this point of view, there is good jus-
tification for a definition of R and T in these terms. It should also be noted that
in many languages, ‘give’ is a high-frequency verb, far more frequent than any
other three-argument verb. This may justify the strategy of defining R and T in
even narrower terms, as the recipient and gift of ‘give’ (cf. Haspelmath 2005a,
b), even though this will not solve the problem of splits entirely, because some
languages have different ‘give’ verbs with different coding patterns.
Be that as it may, we have to accept that the comparative concepts R and T do
not capture the same range of phenomena as the concepts A and P, and are thus
much less significant, in the sense that if we characterize typological differ-
ences between languages in terms of T and R, we say less about the languages
than if we talk about A and P. While it is probably fair to say that ergative and
absolutive (defined in terms of A and P) are “major alignment types”, we are
less justified in saying that alignment in terms of T and R (defined as theme
and recipient of typical physical transfer verbs like ‘give’) are “major” in this
sense (cf. the section heading of Section 1 of Haspelmath 2005a, where this
term is used).
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But the fact that ditransitive alignment in terms of T and R cannot be char-
acterized as “major” does not make these concepts incoherent or irrelevant.
As Lazard (2002, 2006) emphasized, comparative concepts can be regarded as
“arbitrary conceptual frameworks”, whose usefulness is to be judged by the
fruitfulness of the generalizations emerging from studies based on these con-
cepts. And it seems difficult to deny that typological research based on T and
R (such as Siewierska 2003, 2004; Haspelmath 2005a; Malchukov et al. 2010)
has been fruitful.
The question that must be asked, however, is whether there is an alternative
to R and T in Croft’s and Dryer’s sense that is superior in that it allows us to
express even more generalizations. This does not seem to be the case, however.
The Bickelian alternative of defining G as the more goal-like/patient-like and
T as the less goal-like/patient-like argument of the less agent-like arguments
leads to an even more heterogeneous class of arguments (see 14c, d), and to
fewer chances of finding crosslinguistic generalizations. The problems with
Bickelian G and T are completely analogous to the problems with their A and
O, so they need not be repeated here.
7. On the S argument of intransitive clauses
We saw in Section 4 that S can best be defined as the argument of an intransi-
tive clause that receives the treatment normally accorded to the single argument
of a one-argument predicate. But as is well known (Mithun 1991, Donohue
& Wichmann (eds.) 2008), in many languages the single argument of a one-
argument predicate is treated differently in different verb classes. Often one
subclass of (the more patient-like) S arguments is treated like the P, while an-
other subclass of (more agent-like) S arguments is treated like the A. In other
languages, a subclass of (experiencer) S arguments is treated like the R argu-
ment of ditransitive clauses. In the typological literature, the two subclasses of
S are sometimes distinguished as SA vs. SP (or SO, Dixon 1994: 70–83).
Is the concept of S incoherent in view of such “split-S” languages? Harris
(1997: 368) argues that in view of languages like Georgian (with some single-
argument verbs requiring Ergative marking, and others Nominative marking),
SA and SP need to be regarded as primitives, rather than as subtypes of S (as
Dixon does). Just as Dixon has posited S, A, and O as primitives in order
to avoid describing ergative patterns as “twisted versions of accusative pat-
terns”, Harris notes, one needs to work with SA and SP as primitives in order to
avoid describing Georgian as a twisted version of an ergative or an accusative
language. Or as Mithun & Chafe (1999: 578) put it: “Speakers of Iroquoian
languages could say with equal justification that English is a ‘split patient’
language, since English sometimes marks patients as subjects, sometimes as
objects”.
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But Harris and Mithun & Chafe (like Dixon) do not distinguish properly
between the descriptive level and the comparative level. As we saw earlier,
to describe Georgian and Iroquoian, we need semantic roles only to the ex-
tent that there are open, productive verb classes that can be extended only by
verbs of a certain semantic character. But to compare Georgian and Iroquoian
with other languages, both approaches are perfectly coherent. The difference
between them is comparable to the difference between the Comrian and the
Bickelian approach to A and P in two-argument clauses: where Comrie limits
the “primitives” A and P to a subclass of two-argument verbs, Bickel uses two
“primitives” A and P for all two-argument verbs alike. Both approaches are
coherent, but I have argued above that the Comrian approach makes it easier to
state certain generalizations.
With Bickelian A and P, practically all languages are “split-P” languages and
many languages are “split-A” languages, because few (if any) languages extend
their major two-argument pattern to all two-argument clauses. Similarly, the
decision to look at all S arguments together leads to a situation where many
languages are “split-S” languages.
In the Comrian spirit, it would therefore be desirable to focus on a subclass
of intransitive single arguments which show more uniformity across languages
than the class of single intransitive verbs as a whole. A good candidate is the
subclass of uncontrolled change of state verbs like ‘die’, ‘rust’, ‘get lost’, ‘rot’,
‘grow’ (typical unaccusative verbs, cf. Croft 1998: 52–54). Should it turn out
that there is significant variation even within this subclass, one might adopt the
strategy of choosing only the verb ‘die’, as the most typical (and probably most
frequent) uncontrolled change of state verb (just as for ditransitives, some au-
thors have limited themselves to the verb ‘give’). So I tentatively propose that
the original unitary S should be replaced by SU (where U stands for ‘uncon-
trolled change of state’; cf. also Creissels’s (2006: 300) U, proposed to replace
S).
Clearly, a narrowing strategy of this sort has generally been adopted implic-
itly in the literature, because most discussions of split-S systems (e.g., Mer-
lan 1985, Lazard 1986, Mithun 1991, Croft 1998, Arkadiev 2008) have not
taken all monovalent verbs in account, and have completely ignored experien-
tial single-argument verbs with dative or accusative experiencers (of the type
mich friert in German). With the notable exception of Nichols (2008) (who
works in the Bickelian approach), work on split-S patterns has focused on
agentive/patientive monovalents and ignored experiential monovalents, just as
experiential constructions have usually been left aside in discussions of two-
argument patterns, because it is generally understood that something else is
going on there. The idea that one should focus on SU takes this approach to
its logical conclusion. As a consequence, the active-stative type is no longer
a monotransitive alignment type on a par with ergative and accusative, but is
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dealt with separately, just as the treatment of experiential constructions is not
generally subsumed under monotransitive alignment.
8. Conclusion
In this article, I have compared three main ways in which the terms S, A, P, T,
and R (and their notational variants) have been used. I began by noting that they
were introduced primarily in order to allow us to compare different languages
in terms of their alignment, and in order to be able to state generalizations and
to define further comparative concepts such as “passive”.
The first claim of this article is that there are three rather distinct ways in
which the terms have been used in the literature: as universal syntactic func-
tions based on transitivity (the Dixonian approach), as comparative concepts
for the two arguments of a typical action clause (the Comrian approach), and
as generalized semantic roles (the Bickelian approach).
The second claim is that the Comrian approach is best suited for the state-
ment of crosslinguistic generalizations in the domain of classical alignment
phenomena. It is not based on a notion of transitivity and thus allows us to
define (mono)transitive on the basis of A and P (and ditransitive on the
basis of T and R); this is superior to the Dixonian approach, where transitivity
is not properly defined. The Comrian approach to A and P is also superior to
the Bickelian approach, because typical action clauses behave very uniformly
in all languages, so that there are very few (if any) “split-A” and “split-P” lan-
guages. On the much broader Bickelian definition of A and P, almost all lan-
guages are “split-P” and many languages are “split-A” languages. To capture
the traditional generalizations of alignment typology, the Bickelian approach
needs to appeal to narrower concepts such as Pmajor (the P of the major class of
two-argument verbs). To what extent the broader notions of A and P might be
useful in typology remains to be seen.
Both the Dixonian and the Bickelian approach seem to be interested not
only in alignment typology, i.e., in the SAPTR terms as comparative concepts,
but also in providing general terms for describing particular languages, i.e.,
universally applicable descriptive categories. The idea of creating a finite set
of concepts that can be used both for language description and for language
comparison also underlies technological approaches such as the GOLD on-
tology (Farrar & Langendoen 2003), as well as much of generative grammar
(Newmeyer 2007), but languages are simply too diverse for this approach to be
feasible (Lazard 1992; Croft 2001; Haspelmath 2007, 2010).
Thus, typology generally has to be content to capture only some aspects of
language structure (e.g., only the major class of two-argument verbs), whereas
language description needs to be complete. But this does not mean that typol-
ogy cannot gradually enlarge its purview. By focusing on typical action verbs,
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typologists have generally neglected other kinds of two-argument verbs, and
there is no reason not to add further comparative concepts such as Ex (for the
experiencer of typical experiential verbs), St (for the stimulus of typical expe-
riential verbs), Go (for the spatial goal of directional movement verbs), and so
on, in future work.
One final lesson that can be drawn from this article is that linguistic terms
have a tendency to undergo significant semantic change when they migrate
from one scholar to another, or from one way of thinking to another. This is
perhaps unavoidable, but it is useful to be explicit not only about the meanings
of terms, but also about changes in their meanings.
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